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CAMPBELL AS FAIR USE BLUEPRINT?
Pierre N. Leval *

Friends, copyright geeks, I come not to bury Campbell, 1 but to praise
it. I might reasonably be considered a biased critic as Campbell took a
number of suggestions from an article I wrote. 2 Biased or not, I submit
Campbell is a beautifully reasoned opinion, which has demonstrated in
its twenty-one years that it provides a healthy framework for fair use
analysis. That framework promotes the overall objectives of copyright; it
protects the interests of rights holders; and it guards against putting
“manacles upon science.” 3
This is not to say that every case decided under Campbell has been
indisputably correct. But disagreement with some decisions of lower
courts is not a condemnation of Campbell’s blueprint. Furthermore, fair
use decisions will often involve difficult appraisals, susceptible to
reasonable disagreement. Nor is it surprising to find inconsistency in
lower court opinions. Copyright cases come infrequently, especially
those with fair use questions. Many judges are often confronting the
complexities of fair use for the first time, and may be quick to reach out
for what look like easy handholds that are often based on errant dicta.
I.

PRE-CAMPBELL

To appreciate what Campbell did for us, we should look at the law of
fair use prior to Campbell. It was a mess, and it gave virtually no
guidance. For nearly 300 years, courts had acknowledged a need for
doctrine that would allow copying in some circumstances. There
developed a widely accepted view that copying in certain types of
undertakings—criticism, parody, book reviews, news reporting, political

* Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. This talk was delivered at the
University of Washington School of Law’s Fair Use in a Digital Age Conference, April 17, 2015.
1. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
2. See generally id. (citing Pierre N. Leval, Toward A Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV.
1105 (1990)).
3. Cary v. Kearsley, (1803) 170 Eng. Rep. 679, 680.
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commentary, historical works, scholarly analyses—would likely be a fair
use. But, with the exception of Joseph Story’s spare, but well targeted,
caution in 1841 4 that a fair use must not “diminish the profits, or
supersede the objects, of the original work,” 5 courts had failed to explain
how to distinguish between copying that infringes and copying that is
fair use. Decisions were made from the gut, without any real
explanation.
The confusion in the law was due, in no small part, to careless
utterances by the High Court. The Court needlessly floated a number of
unhelpful, distracting, counterproductive propositions, which had no
bearing on the outcome of the particular case and have caused no end of
confusion and harm.
First, in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 6 in
gratuitous dictum, the Supreme Court declared that “every commercial
use of copyrighted material is presumptively” an unfair use. 7 This
statement played no role in the decision. What is more, it was
incomprehensible. Types of enterprise in which fair use are
conventionally found—news reporting and analysis, historical and
biographical studies, reviews of books, theater, and film, as well as
parody—are conventionally done commercially for profit. The notion
that commercial uses were presumptively not fair uses plagued fair use
analysis until at last it was blunted by Campbell.
In Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 8 the
Supreme Court rejected The Nation’s claim that its taking of President
Ford’s explanation of the Nixon pardon was fair use because it was so
newsworthy. Public interest in the author’s writing would not justify
disregard of the author’s copyright. This was altogether valid.
Otherwise, an author’s success in writing an important book would be
the author’s undoing. And, as for harm, the Court explained that by
scooping the “heart of [Ford’s] book,” 9 The Nation had usurped the
“important marketable subsidiary right” of first publication. 10 Had the
Court stopped there, its reasoning would have fit into a useful
framework for analysis of future fair use disputes. Unfortunately, the
4. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901).
5. Id. at 348 (emphasis added).
6. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
7. Id. at 451.
8. 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
9. Id. at 600 (quoting Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 557 F. Supp. 1067, 1072
(S.D.N.Y. 1983)).
10. Id. at 549.
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opinion aired numerous distracting aphorisms—many of them
misguided.
(a) For starters, the Court asserted that quotation from an unpublished
work tends “to negate the defense of fair use.” 11 To the extent that
proposition could be correct for Harper & Row’s facts, where the
unauthorized publication scooped the imminent initial publication, the
proposition would be at least equally incorrect in other circumstances,
such as where the purpose of the copying is to reveal important facts that
the rights holder hopes to conceal. If, for example, The Nation had
discovered secret documents establishing an illicit bargain between
Nixon and Ford—if, for example, Nixon had demanded a pardon as a
condition of his resignation in Ford’s favor, and Ford had promised to
give it—the Court might have said, “[t]he unpublished nature of the
original strongly supports a finding of fair use.”
Copyright’s justification lies in its aim to stimulate creativity for the
enrichment of public knowledge. Exchange of letters establishing
corrupt bargains is not stimulated by the authors’ hope of publishing
them for profit. Quoting such letters to reveal what their contents tell
about their authors serves copyright’s primary goal of enriching public
knowledge—without derogating from the parallel goal of providing
authors with financial inducements to create. Fortunately, seven years
later, Congress passed a special amendment to § 107, rejecting this
privileging of unpublished works. 12
(b) Second, the Harper & Row Court said there is “a greater need to
disseminate factual works than works of fiction or fantasy.” 13 This
served no role in supporting the Court’s decision. It has been widely
understood to mean that the defense of fair use is favored when
quotation is from a factual work. To me that makes no sense. To be sure,
there is often a need to test the accuracy of propositions advanced in
factual works, and quotation for such purposes may well be justified as
fair use. But that is a very different proposition from allowing a second
writer to copy wholesale from an earlier writer’s treatment of the same
subject—just because the subject is factual.
(c) Finally—and most harmful of all—in reference to the fact that The

11. Id. at 551 (quoting 3 M. NIMMER, COPYRIGHT § 13–62, n.2 (1984)).
12. This was after Harper & Row’s suggestion re-emerged in the Second Circuit’s ruling in
Salinger that unpublished works “normally enjoy insulation from fair use copying.” Salinger v.
Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 1987), opinion supplemented on denial of reh’g, 818
F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1987). “The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair
use . . . .” 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
13. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 563.
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Nation had gotten access through a “purloined manuscript,” 14 the Court
erroneously characterized fair use as an equitable doctrine 15 and
disastrously declared that “[f]air use presupposes ‘good faith’ and ‘fair
dealing.’” 16 I will return to this issue later on.
Random distribution of cases from the District Court Clerk’s Office
sent me an amazing stream of fascinating fair use cases—suits by J. D.
Salinger 17 and the heirs of L. Ron Hubbard 18 and Igor Stravinsky 19 to
enjoin biographical writings that quoted from their private documents,
and the suit brought by publishers of scholarly journals against Texaco
to enjoin Texaco’s geologists from photocopying scientific articles for
their files. 20 For the decisions of these cases, the precedents offered scant
guidance, and the guidance they gave was largely bad guidance. My
decisions scored a sixty-seven percent reversal rate. I thought at the time
that it had been exciting to find myself at the cutting edge of the law,
even if in the role of the salami.
II.

CAMPBELL

The Campbell decision in 1994 brought to an end fair use’s odyssey
of bad piloting and aimless drift. In place of a laundry list of
meaningless or harmful aphorisms, the Court undertook at last to explain
fair use in terms of the goals of copyright—protection of the author’s
exclusive entitlement to publish for profit, for the enrichment of public
knowledge. Campbell recognized that, at least in some circumstances,
those who quote from the writings of prior authors are also authors, and
that quotation from prior writings for new purposes can also enrich
public knowledge. To this end, Campbell’s explanation allowed copying
in order to advance different understandings or achieve new
14. Id. at 542.
15. Id. at 551 (mentioning “the equitable nature of the fair use doctrine”); see also WILLIAM F.
PATRY, THE FAIR USE PRIVILEGE IN COPYRIGHT LAW 5 (2d ed. 1995) (“It is . . . incorrect to
characterize fair use as a child of equity. Rather, it was the child of the common law that sought to
accommodate a statutory scheme . . . .” (emphasis in original)).
16. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 562 (quoting Time Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp.
130, 146 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)).
17. Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 650 F. Supp. 413 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) rev’d, 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir.
1987) opinion supplemented on denial of reh'g, 818 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1987).
18. New Era Publ’ns Int’l v. Henry Holt & Co., 695 F. Supp. 1493 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) aff’d on other
grounds, 873 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1989).
19. Craft v. Kobler, 667 F. Supp. 120 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
20. Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 802 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), amended (Oct. 26,
1992), aff'd, 37 F.3d 881 (2d Cir. 1994), order amended and superseded, 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994)
and aff'd, 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994).
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objectives—so long as the copying is achieved without competing
significantly with the author’s exclusive entitlements.
In my view, the most important among Campbell’s contributions are
the following:
• It taught us not to search for answers in the words of the
statute, as Congress made clear in its report that it was not
undertaking to tell us what fair use is. Its intention was only
to acknowledge this important doctrine in the statute,
summarizing what courts had said and leaving further
development to the courts that created the doctrine.21
Congress would have been wiser and would have invited less
occasion for misunderstanding had it written simply that fair
use is not infringement. That is all it meant.
• Campbell re-emphasized Story’s focus on whether the
secondary work diminishes the profits and “‘supersede[s] the
objects’ of the original.” 22
• It rejected the utility of bright-line rules—especially the
misconceived bias against commercial uses.23
• It cast doubt on the continuing validity of Harper & Row’s
assertion of a good faith requirement. 24
• It cautioned courts not to be too ready (in cases raising a nonfrivolous contention of fair use) to enjoin the work found to
infringe. 25 A work that includes infringing copying may at the
same time contain much that is non-infringing and valuable—
including some fair use copying, and other copying that does
not infringe because it communicates facts and ideas, which
copyright does not protect. Copyright is a commercial
doctrine—not a “moral right,” as the author’s right is
conceived in Europe. Copyright’s goal is to guarantee authors
reasonable compensation. Reasonable compensation for
infringement can in many cases be a fully adequate copyright
remedy, while an injunction might deprive the public of a
work of significant value.

21. Congress “intended [in § 107] to restate the present judicial doctrine of fair use, not to
change, narrow, or enlarge it in any way.” H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 66 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5680.
22. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (alteration in original)
(quoting Justice Joseph Story in Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901)).
23. Id. at 577–78.
24. Id. at 585 n.18.
25. Id. at 578 n.10.
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Finally, Campbell rejected treating the statute’s four factors
as disparate inquiries, requiring instead that they be “weighed
together, in light of the purposes of copyright.” 26
Under Campbell, the four statutory factors are symbiotic. They
represent interrelated parts of a cohesive inquiry, instructing
examination from all pertinent sides of the question: How to better
advance the objectives of copyright?
What emerges are two essential and intimately intertwined questions:
1. Does the secondary work copy from the original in pursuit of
a different objective—a “transformative” purpose?
2. Does the secondary work compete significantly with the
original, by offering itself as a significant substitute in
markets that the copyright law reserves to the original
author?
While these may sound like two discrete questions, Campbell took
pains to point out their interdependence. 27 The greater the divergence of
the objectives of the copying from those of the original, the less likely
that the secondary work will compete in the original’s exclusive
markets—the less likely, in Story’s words, that the secondary work will
“diminish the profits, or supersede the objects, of the original work.” 28
From this perspective, they are not two separate questions at all, but
rather two facets of one complex question. The transformative purpose
of the copy remains subservient to the protection of the market value of
the copyright—the concern of the fourth factor, which Harper & Row
had identified as “undoubtedly the single most important element of fair
use.” 29
Campbell’s touchstone is copyright’s touchstone. The objectives of
fair use are the objectives of copyright. A copyright law that did not
allow for fair use, as fair use is conceived in Campbell, would fail to
satisfy copyright’s objectives. Coming just before the dawn of the
Internet, Campbell was either prescient, or at least lucky, in formulating
a mode of analysis that would serve to produce sound answers to
questions that have arisen in droves in our digital age.

26. Id. at 578.
27. Id. at 591 (“[W]hen . . . the second use is transformative, market substitution is at least less
certain, and market harm may not be so readily inferred.” ).
28. Id. at 576 (quoting Justice Story’s decision in Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D.
Mass. 1841) (No. 4901)).
29. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985).
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HOW IS CAMPBELL DOING?

Let’s examine some of the criticisms of Campbell.
A.

Complete Unchanged Copies.

A puzzling view is that a complete, unchanged copy cannot be a fair
use. 30 This seems arbitrary and incompatible with the objectives of
copyright. It would be disastrously limiting, especially now in the digital
age when virtually every use of digital material involves making a
complete copy.
Even before the digital age, innumerable valuable functions were
served by making complete unchanged copies, without harm to the value
of the copyright or diminution of the incentive to create.
• One entrusted with a unique manuscript to read would want
to make a copy to ensure against loss, coffee stains, or, if in
Europe, cigarette burns.
• Every museum or serious art collection needs a photographic
copy of each work in its collection, for numerous purposes: to
provide a meaningful inventory list, to guide future
restorations in event of damage, and to prove ownership in
case of theft.
• An art historian who seeks to assess the influence Matisse and
Picasso asserted on one another based on comparison of
paintings which hang in different places throughout the world
would require photographic copies.
• Personal letters and memoranda of elected government
officials and other prominent persons should be subject to
revelation by journalists and historians to reveal important
facts about the writers, which they or their descendants might
wish to conceal. (In such circumstances, reproducing the
original without change can be important to dispel suspicion
that the secondary, expository writer may have distorted by
selective quotation or paraphrase.)
In the digital age, the need for ability to make complete unchanged
copies without liability has soared. Numerous well-reasoned court
decisions have found a fair-use home for complete digital copies that
transformatively expand knowledge about the works without interfering
with the legitimate entitlements or incentives of the authors of the works.
Among these are:
30. See, e.g., Paul Goldstein, Copyright’s Commons, 29 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 1, 5–6 (2005).
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Arriba Soft 31 and Perfect 10, 32 where low-resolution
thumbnails of images were transformatively employed to
provide an Internet pathway to the originals. Because of the
low resolution, they did not offer meaningful substitutes to
potential purchasers of copies of the original images.
• iParadigms, 33 where digital copies of student theses were
used to detect plagiarism.
• Swatch, 34 where a copy of a private discussion of a publicly
held corporation’s operating statistics between the
corporation’s executives and selected financial industry
analysts was disseminated to a broader public.
• HathiTrust, 35 where large numbers of books were digitized to
create a tool for identifying and locating books that use
particular words (as well as telling where in the book the
words are found), without allowing users to view the text; and
where the court approved provision of digitized copies in a
format accessible to the print impaired, in view of the
“insignifican[ce]” of the market for the product. 36
Campbell’s framework soundly guided those courts to the conclusion
that the copies were made for a purpose substantially different from that
of the originals and that, in part because of that difference of purpose,
and in part because of precautions taken, the copies did not substantially
compete with, or substitute for, the originals.
B.

Evisceration of the Fourth Factor?

An objection made particularly with respect to digital copies is that,
under Campbell, identification of transformative purpose may override
the fourth factor’s interest in protecting the value of the copyright.
Professor Ginsburg of Columbia Law School notes that a finding of a
broadly beneficial transformative purpose may lead the court to give low
importance, or none at all, to the copyright owner’s fourth factor interest
in earning revenues from her copyright. Instead of reaping the rewards

31. Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 280 F.3d 934 (9th Cir. 2002), amended by 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir.
2002).
32. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007).
33. A.V. ex rel. Vanderhye v. iParadigms, LLC, 562 F.3d 630 (4th Cir. 2009).
34. Swatch Grp. Mgmt. Servs. Ltd. v. Bloomberg L.P., 756 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 2014).
35. Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2014).
36. Id. at 103; cf. S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 64 (1975) (“If the work is ‘out of print’ and unavailable
for purchase through normal channels, the user may have more justification for reproducing it.”).
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of their creations, then, authors may be forced to subsidize the world’s
harvest of their contributions. 37 A further criticism is that a finding that
the secondary work does not compete in the market for the original work
can blind courts to the need to determine whether the secondary work
competes with a derivative of the copyrighted work, for which a market
has not yet developed.
If lower court opinions are vulnerable to these criticisms, they are not
criticisms of Campbell, but rather of misinterpretations of Campbell.
While Campbell unquestionably gives high importance to the
enrichment of society provided by creatively transformative copying,
that importance is not at the expense of the fourth factor. To the
contrary, Campbell characterizes the first factor inquiry as subservient to
the fourth. 38 And if lower court opinions have said that the fourth factor
favored fair use because the secondary work did not compete with the
original, without exploring whether it competes with a derivative, this
may be attributable either to insufficiently cautious diction, or perhaps to
the absence in the particular case of a plausible argument based on
derivative rights. Campbell itself explicitly explored whether the
secondary work infringed the plaintiff’s right in derivative forms; indeed
the Supreme Court remanded on that question. 39
C.

Vagueness and Unpredictability

Some deplore Campbell’s rejection of bright-line rules, arguing that
vagueness produces unpredictability, which chills secondary creativity. 40
37. See, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, Letter from the US: Exclusive Rights, Exceptions, and Uncertain
Compliance with International Norms – Part II (Fair Use), REVUE INTERNATIONALE DU DROIT
D’AUTEUR (forthcoming Jan. 2015) (manuscript at 4–19) (Columbia Law and Economics, Working
Paper No. 503), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2539178 (noting that authors are rarely, if
ever, in this position).
38. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 591 (1994) (demonstrating that
transformative works tend to be fair uses because they are less likely to “act[] as a substitute” for the
original work and thus to “affect the market for the original in a way cognizable under [the fourth]
factor”).
39. Id. at 594.
40. See, e.g., CHRISTINA BOHANNAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, CREATION WITHOUT RESTRAINT:
PROMOTING LIBERTY AND RIVALRY IN INNOVATION 159 (2012) (arguing that the “vagueness and
uncertainty” of the post-Campbell fair use standard “have an enormous chilling effect on the vast
universe of speech that incorporates and builds on copyrighted material”); Shyamkrishna
Balganesh, Foreseeability and Copyright Incentives, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1569, 1620 (2009) (“The
uncertainty of the standard, if anything, is likely to deter potential users . . . from treading too close
to the boundaries of impermissible copying.”); David Fagundes, Crystals in the Public Domain, 50
B.C. L. REV. 139, 178 (2009) (calling for “crystallizing fair use by incorporating determinate
benchmarks for legitimate takings [through] a straightforward formula: take standards, and replace
them with rules”); Gideon Parchomovsky & Kevin A. Goldman, Fair Use Harbors, 93 VA. L. REV.
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Without doubt, a clear rule is a good thing, at least if it produces good
results. But bright-line tests applied to complex circumstances are likely
to produce unjustifiable results, which will be even more injurious to
creativity than uncertainty.
When copyright disputes reach bad results, the ultimate loser is the
public, which is the primary intended beneficiary of the copyright law.
This injury to the public occurs regardless of whether fair use is too
liberally dispensed, harming the ability of original authors to earn from
their creations and thus chilling creation, or too narrowly applied,
foreclosing the dissemination of secondary works that advance
copyright’s goals without significant harm to the original authors. In
either case, the public loses.
A bright-line rule that would either place unreasonable restraints on
the creativity of secondary users, or unreasonably diminish the
protection of original authors, would not be an improvement. Deploring
a test’s vagueness is easy. Much more difficult is to come up with a clear
test that would provide better, or at least acceptable, results. So far as I
am aware, none have been suggested.
Furthermore, I do not agree with the proposition that fair use
adjudications under Campbell have been wildly unpredictable. While
some cases involve very difficult exercises of line drawing, on the
whole, I believe the great majority of circuit-level opinions since
Campbell have been well justified and reasonably predictable. 41
D.

Complementary

An interesting quibble with Campbell comes from the endlessly
resourceful and fascinating mind of Judge Posner. He argues that,
instead of the concept of “transformativeness,” the goal of the first factor
would be better explained by asking whether the original and the
secondary works are in a “complementary relationship”—as with a
hammer and nail—so that in conjunction the two achieve something
neither can achieve on its own—to the mutual benefit of both. 42

1483, 1489, 1511–18 (2007) (arguing that fair use is unpredictable and suggesting nonexclusive,
bright-line rules defining per se fair uses).
41. See Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537, 2537 (2009) (“If
one analyzes putative fair uses in light of cases previously decided in the same policy cluster, it is
generally possible to predict whether a use is likely to be fair or unfair.”).
42. Ty, Inc. v Publ’ns Int’l, Inc., 292 F.3d 512, 517–18 (7th Cir. 2002); see also WILLIAM M.
LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW
153–54 (2003).
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Judge Posner illustrates this by reference to book reviews.43
Publishers depend on book reviews to publicize their books. Book
reviews are more useful to book readers if they quote from the books
they review. If reviewers’ right to quote depended on permission from
the publisher, the public would justifiably distrust the independence of
the reviews. Therefore, both sides benefit from the right of reviewers to
quote without permission, and the consent of publishers to such
quotation can be inferred from the overall benefit they derive, regardless
of the fact that the quotation will be sometimes in the service of a
negative review. 44
I believe this argument fails. It works with the example of fair use that
Judge Posner has chosen. But, for other heartland examples of fair use, it
doesn’t. Consider where the secondary author—an investigative
reporter—quotes unknown private writings of a public figure to reveal
the plaintiff’s bigotry, lies, cruelty, crimes, or corruption, through the
plaintiff’s own words. Effective exposition by the secondary writer
requires copying the original words. The expository writer cannot say
merely, “That man was a liar and a thief. Take my word for it.”
Even if Posner is correct that the consent of book publishers can be
inferred from benefits that unauthorized quotation confers on them, if
the Presidents, Prime Ministers, Senators, and Judges of the nations of
the world could elect either to authorize or to prohibit free quotation
from their previously unpublished writings, what percentage would say
yes to free quotation? My guess is zero. Parody is another classic
example of fair use. The essence of parody is ridicule, and few authors
would consent to have their work ridiculed. The “complementary”
formula, requiring the flow of benefits to the owner of rights in the
quoted material to justify fair use, would kill off many forms of
secondary use that further copyright’s objectives.
A further problem with using the term “complementary” as the key to
fair use is that the word perfectly describes the classic examples of
derivative works, which by definition cannot be fair uses, as they are
protected by the author’s copyright in the original work. Conversion of a
novel into a film, or of a cartoon character into a plush toy, translation of
a poem—these are perfect examples of complementaries, but they do not
qualify for fair use.

43. Ty, 292 F.3d at 517–18; see also LANDES & POSNER, supra note 42, at 153–54.
44. Ty, 292 F.3d at 517–18; see also LANDES & POSNER, supra note 42, at 153–54.
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1.

Ambiguity of “Transformative”

[Vol. 90:597

I recognize that the word “transformative” suffers from the same
ambiguity as “complementary.” This raises a problem. The problem
arises from the need for standards to distinguish derivatives (which are
governed by the original author’s copyright) from fair uses (which are
not). Although not always recognized as such, this question is often the
crux of a fair use dispute. A confusing application of the fourth factor
arises when the original author has suffered no loss of sales of the
original work, but has a credible claim of infringement for the making of
a derivative. To say that the secondary use was transformative is not a
sufficient answer because the word “transformative,” like
“complementary,” can apply to derivatives as well as to fair uses.
Indeed, the statutory definition of a “derivative” employs the word
“transform.” 45 Accordingly, saying that a secondary work transforms the
original does nothing to distinguish a fair use from a derivative.
But it does not follow from this ambiguity that the word
“transformative” is an inappropriate symbol to signify the crux of the
first factor inquiry. I don’t think I have heard a better one. Because some
manner of change is at the heart of both derivatives and fair uses, any
word that focuses descriptively on that crucial fair use element will
suffer from the same ambiguity. Indeed, the word “derivative” also
suffers from it. Any copying, even if it achieves fair use status,
necessarily derives from the original.
Transformative, however, was never intended as a full definition or
explanation of fair use. If a transformative purpose is required for fair
use, that does not mean that any sort of transformation qualifies.
Campbell (and my article as well) would certainly have done well to
explain the tautological, but not necessarily obvious, point that the
transformative purpose required to achieve fair use cannot be the same
type of transformation that results in a derivative.
If that were the end of the problem, it would be easy enough to fix.
All that would be required would be an authoritative opinion explaining
that, while a transformative use is usually necessary to satisfy the first
45. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (“A ‘derivative work’ is a work based upon one or more
preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization,
motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other
form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of editorial
revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications which, as a whole, represent an original
work of authorship, is a ‘derivative work.’”).
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factor, it is not sufficient. Transformations of the sort that produce a
substitute for a derivative work don’t qualify. But that is not the end of
the matter. The more serious and much more difficult problem is how to
distinguish between transformative uses that can result in fair uses and
those that result in derivatives.
2.

How to Tell a Derivative

How should we distinguish between fair uses and derivatives?
(a) Music Sampling. Think of various manifestations of musical
quotation or sampling:
• A piece of new music that includes a few bars from a wellknown work, a kind of nod of acknowledgment to the
influence of the former—fair use or a derivative?
• A new piece of music consists largely of a stringing together
of such quotations from numerous former influential works?
• A new work that contains passages copied from a little known
work?
(b) Quiz Books. Consider quiz books. Suppose one without
authorization markets a trivia quiz book, based on Downton
Abbey or The Sopranos.
• “What was Lady Mary wearing when she first met Matthew
Crawley?”
• “What was the name of the boat on which Tony and his
friends bade farewell to Big Pussy?”
(c) Sequels. What about sequels?
• Suppose that among the 100,000 members of a Harry Potter
Internet Fan Club, members freely compose and share
sequels.46
• Or, consider a sequel like The Wind Done Gone, in which the
new work retells the original’s story from a different
character’s point of view, which inherently attacks the
original’s assumptions. 47
Should the answers for the two types of sequel be the same, or
different?
Transformations of the sort producing fair use are usually of a
different character from the transformations that produce derivatives. In
the fair use context, the word most frequently refers to the purpose of the

46. See generally Rebecca Tushnet, Legal Fictions: Copyright, Fan Fiction, and a New Common
Law, 17 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 651 (1997).
47. See Suntrust v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 252 F. 3d 1165 (11th Cir. 2001).
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copying—ordinarily to communicate some kind of commentary about
the original or provide information about it. As Campbell explained in
its distinction between parody—an exemplary instance of fair use—and
satire,
[t]he heart of any parodist’s claim to quote from existing
material is the use of some elements of a prior author’s
composition to create a new one that, at least in part, comments
on that author’s works. If, on the contrary, the commentary has
no critical bearing on the substance or style of the original
composition, which the alleged infringer merely uses to get
attention or to avoid the drudgery in working up something
fresh, the claim to fairness in borrowing from another’s work
diminishes accordingly (if it does not vanish). . . . Parody needs
to mimic an original to make its point, and so has some claim to
use the creation of its victim’s . . . imagination, whereas satire
can stand on its own two feet and so requires justification for the
very act of borrowing. 48
In the derivative context, by contrast, what Campbell refers to as the
“critical bearing” 49 of the secondary work will generally be absent. The
transformation involved in making a derivative is usually one of form or
medium, offering the same work in a new version, form, medium, or
shape, rather than offering information or commentary about the
original.
The classic understanding of derivatives is that they are works that represent the original author’s creative expression in a different medium or
form to an audience that either is, or would be, motivated by
appreciation of the original author’s creative expression—a novel
converted into a film, a poem translated into another language, an oil
painting photographically reproduced on paper. Consistent with this
notion, the statute defines derivatives by a “such-as” list which includes
“translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization,
motion picture version, . . . art reproduction,” etc. 50
In this formulation, Congress was not defining derivative doctrine. It
was legislating in an older mode, in which Congress viewed the courts
as partners. Congress sought to express its policy through a list of
examples that would convey the rough idea of the types of
transformations Congress had in mind as protected derivatives—leaving
it to the courts to interpret Congress’s intention and formulate a standard
48. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 580–81 (1994) (internal citations omitted).
49. Id. at 580.
50. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
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that would accomplish Congress’s goal.
3.

What Should the Standard Be?

Campbell noted that “the market for potential derivative uses includes
only those that creators of original works would in general
develop . . . .” 51 This appropriately limited the scope of derivatives.
Authors cannot enlarge the scope of their copyright (to the detriment of
society) to control criticism, analyses, mockery, or parody simply by
offering to license such uses. Nor would it necessarily matter that users
agreed to pay for such licenses. If the price is not prohibitive, would-be
users will often pay for authorization to use without challenge,
notwithstanding that they might have the right to do so without
authorization—just to avoid the uncertainties and expenses of litigation.
Campbell did not undertake the further step of analyzing the scope of the
territory covered by the derivative right. It did, however, offer the
illuminating passage quoted just above on the distinction between
parody and satire, explaining that a parody is more likely to be fair use
because it draws its justification for the taking from the fact that its
purpose is to comment on the original. This distinction between parody
and satire sheds light on the more general distinction between fair uses
and derivative works.
Whether a type of copying infringes the author’s rights over
derivatives, or is a fair use, is a matter of copyright policy. Copyright
law’s ability to achieve its objectives depends in part on how courts
answer the question. Just as courts have made crucial normative
judgments, drawing the boundary lines of copyright to include manner
of expression, but not ideas and facts, courts must make a normative
judgment to draw the boundary line that separates derivatives from fair
uses, and must do so in relation to the nature and purpose of copyright.
Focus on the nature and purpose of the copyright can provide a
helpful approach to making this distinction. What the copyright protects
is the author’s manner of expression. The examples of derivatives set
forth in the statutory list are of secondary works that seek to recommunicate the protected expression of the original, converted into a
different form or medium. This suggests at least the germ of a useful
test.
The more the aim of the secondary copying is to communicate the
original author’s manner of expression (albeit in a changed form)—
without commentary on it or provision of information about it—the
51. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 592.
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stronger the argument that the secondary transformation should be
classed as a derivative, and be subject to the original author’s copyright.
In contrast, the more the copying is done for the purpose of
communicating attitudes or information about the original, the stronger
the argument supporting fair use.
This germ of a test would not serve to answer all such questions. As
with other aspects of fair use analysis, it should not be a rigid rule.
Furthermore, courts have concluded that some secondary uses that
merely seek to communicate the original author’s manner of expression
in a changed form or medium (without transformative purpose) qualify
as fair use, when the costs of producing such transformations are so
high, and the market for them so small, that the rights holder would not
incur the costs of producing them herself. An example is the recent
HathiTrust case, in which the court found fair use for conversion of
books into a format accessible to certified print-impaired users, noting
that the market for such a format was insignificant. 52
IV.

BAD FAITH

A final word on Campbell’s contributions. Few pronouncements have
been more harmful to fair use than the Supreme Court’s assertion in
Harper & Row that “[f]air use presupposes good faith and fair
dealing.” 53 Why is this so harmful? First, a good-faith requirement
would undermine the primary goal of copyright—to enrich public
knowledge. Equally important, such a requirement would have very bad
practical consequences for all participants.
The copyright is a commercial property right given by law to authors
to stimulate creativity so as to benefit society at large. Three limitations
on the scope of the copyright undertake to assure that copyright will
advance, rather than suppress, that goal. The goal would be seriously
harmed if original authorship encompassed the right to suppress the
publication by others of facts or ideas contained in the original and fair
uses made of it. The fact that a secondary user, who copies to
disseminate facts or discuss ideas contained in the original, or to make
transformative fair uses, may have acted in bad faith has no bearing on
the copyright law’s goal of allowing such uses for the enrichment of
public knowledge, without harm to the original author’s financial
52. Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87, 103 (2d Cir. 2014); cf. S. REP. NO. 94-473, at
64 (1975) (“If the work is ‘out of print’ and unavailable for purchase through normal channels, the
user may have more justification for reproducing it.”).
53. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985).
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incentives to create. The public’s access to important knowledge should
not be barred because of bad behavior by the purveyor of the knowledge.
A copier’s bad faith has no logical bearing on the scope of the original
author’s copyright.
Investigative writers often need to dissemble to obtain access to raw
materials for valuable expository works. Those who write to expose the
corruption of public figures may need to falsely portray themselves as
ardent admirers to gain access to private files. It makes no sense for
copyright law to deprive the public of the knowledge the secondary
author provides, and impose liability on the publisher of the secondary
work, because the secondary writer engaged in deceptive sweet-talk. The
law has other remedies, both civil and criminal, for deceitful conduct. It
is not the concern of the copyright law. Making it copyright’s concern
would impair copyright’s objective of enriching public knowledge.
Of more immediate practical import, a good-faith requirement would
impose huge inefficiencies, costs, and uncertainties on everyone
concerned. The law should permit the prospective publisher of an
expository work that quotes from the letters and memoranda of a public
figure to make a reasonably confident evaluation of whether the
publication would be an infringement or fair use by studying and
comparing the two texts. The publisher should not be compelled to
launch a costly, difficult investigation into the secondary author’s
dealings with her sources before deciding whether to publish her work.
A good-faith requirement would add enormous costs, burdens, and
chilling risks to the publishing process, thus harming the copyright law’s
objectives.
Such a requirement would also sabotage an efficient judicial process.
Fair use disputes should generally be amenable to disposition on the
pleadings or on summary judgment. The answer should ordinarily be
evident from study and comparison of the texts. But, if judgment will
depend on what the secondary writer said to get access to the files and a
moralistic evaluation of whether she acted in good faith, courts will
frequently be unable to decide in the pretrial stages of the litigation.
Trials, perhaps with juries, will be required, which will impose not only
huge expenses on all participants, but also catastrophic delays of
publication, as well as potentially quirky results influenced by a jury’s
sympathies.
It is hard to knock good faith, and easy to villainize bad faith, but
allowing allegations of bad faith to play a role in fair use adjudications
would hurt everyone. It would be a lose-lose proposition.
Accordingly, among the many great benefits bestowed by Campbell
was its tactful, but firm, step in the direction of correcting Harper &
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Row’s misstep. Campbell undertakes comprehensive instruction on how
fair use analysis should be made, nowhere assigning any pertinence to
whether there was bad faith in the development of the claimed fair use.
That by itself strongly suggests the Court was saying the question is not
a part of fair use analysis. Nor does Campbell repeat Harper & Row’s
canard that fair use is an “equitable doctrine.” Then, in footnote 18, after
noting conflicting precedent on the pertinence of good faith, the Court
added, “Even if good faith were central to fair use, [the defendant’s]
actions were not inconsistent with good faith.” 54 The formulation, “Even
if it were,” strongly implies, “It isn’t.”55 This was a diplomatic way of
putting in doubt the survival of the earlier assertion without forcing
those who had joined in the opinion to acknowledge error (something
judges hate doing).
It is hard to think of a more useful role copyright scholarship could
play today than by convincing the Supreme Court to finish the job begun
by Campbell and expressly disavow that fair use presupposes good faith.
V.

COPYRIGHT’S FIRST AMENDMENT

A concluding thought. Copyright and freedom of the press are
uncomfortable bedfellows. It is not easy to see how copyright could
survive under our Constitution if it did not have its own express
constitutional authorization.
Even with that authorization, the copyright, if too broadly construed,
would clash intolerably with a free press. Although the “Progress of
Science” (or knowledge) explains the justification for “securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings,” 56 overly broad authorial control would undermine
the progress of knowledge and clash with press freedom.
Wise judicial tailoring of the scope of copyright has minimized that
conflict. Together with the doctrines that remove the use of facts and
ideas from the control of copyright, fair use serves as the First
Amendment’s agent within the framework of copyright. Campbell crafts
a fine balance, converting a head-on conflict into a healthy synergy.

54. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 585.
55. H.W. FOWLER, A DICTIONARY OF MODERN ENGLISH USAGE 595 (2d ed. 1965) (discussing
the counterfactual implication of the subjunctive); THEODORE M. BERNSTEIN, THE CAREFUL
WRITER: A MODERN GUIDE TO ENGLISH USAGE 430 (1965) (same).
56. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.

